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BANKRUPTCY LAW-THE EXEMPTION OF ERISA-QUALIFIED PLANS
FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
Velis v. Kardanis (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code (Code) was enacted to reconcile two juxta-
posed interests: preserving the creditor's rights and providing the
debtor with a fresh start.1 The Code, however, has not provided, as was
envisioned in its promulgation, a bright line to distinguish these two
interests.2 This lack of clarity is especially evident in the Code's treat-
ment of retirement savings plans regulated by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).3
1. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
The Graham court noted that the Code was enacted to "convert[] the estate into
cash for distribution among creditors." Id. In addition, the Code permits the
debtor "to exempt property [from the estate] needed for a fresh start." Id.
2. Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983). The Code
was enacted to replace the morass of the then existing Bankruptcy Act (Act). Id.
Under the Act, there was a blurred line between the property included in the
bankruptcy estate, which would be accessible to the creditor, and the property
excluded from the bankruptcy estate, which would be available for the debtor's
unencumbered fresh start. Id. The categorization of property interests was pro-
vided by the Act's "complicated melange of references to State law . . . [which
did] little to further the bankruptcy policy of distribution of the debtor's prop-
erty to his creditor in satisfaction of his debts." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 175 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136. The Code was
enacted to simplify this identification process by including in the bankruptcy es-
tate all property in which the debtor had a "legal or equitable interest." Goff,
706 F.2d at 578; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). For the text of § 541(a),
see infra note 17.
3. See John Minton Newell, ERISA Retirement Plans in Individual Bankruptcy,
19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183, 188 (1985). In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to
"eliminate discrimination against employees who did not have an opportunity to
participate in retirement plans." Karen Rubner Grotberg, Comment, There
Should Be Parity in Bankruptcy Between Keogh Plans and Other ERISA Plans, 80 Nw. U.
L. REV. 165, 166 (1985). In addition, ERISA provides protection for the self-
employed who previously did not have adequate retirement savings. Id. at 165-
66. ERISA ensures that all employees were provided the opportunity to partici-
pate in a retirement savings plan and that the promised benefits under the plan
would be available upon the employee's retirement. CAMILLA E. WATSON &
MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, FEDERAL TAXATION OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS
10 (1989).
Of the nine circuits which have addressed the issue of retirement savings
plans regulated by ERISA, four have held that such plans are part of the bank-
ruptcy estate, unless they are enforceable under state law as spendthrift trusts.
See Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding that "ERISA and IRC anti-alienation provisions in debtors
pension and profit sharing plan does not create a Federal non-bankruptcy exclu-
sion"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lich-
(859)
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Under § 541(c)(2) of the Code, a debtor's interest in a trust is ex-
cluded from the bankruptcy estate if the trust has "[a] restriction on (its]
... transfer... that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."'4
Unfortunately, Congress has not provided any definitive guidance re-
garding the scope of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law." '5 Con-
sequently, courts have been compelled to determine whether
§ 541(c)(2) protects trusts with restrictions imposed under federal stat-
ute,6 or whether the exclusion provided under § 541(c) (2) is limited to
strahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that "ERISA-qualifying
pension plans ... are excluded pursuant to § 541 (c)(2) only if they are enforcea-
ble under state law as spendthrift trusts"); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271 (holding
that "Congress only intended by § 541(c)(2) to preserve the status traditional
spendthrift trusts, as recognized by state law, enjoyed under the old Bankruptcy
Act"); Goff, 706 F.2d at 577 (stating that exemption § 541 (c)(2) "was intended as
a narrow reference to state 'spendthrift trust' law and not as a broad reference to
all other law, both federal and state, including ERISA").
Four other circuits have held that retirement savings plans regulated by
either federal or state law are exempt from the bankruptcy estate. See Gladwell
v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that "a
tax-qualified ERISA pension or profit sharing plan is exempt from the bank-
ruptcy estate under 541(c)(2)"); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that "the restrictions which must be recognized in bankruptcy
under § 541(c)(2) are not limited to state spendthrift-trust law, but include re-
strictions enforceable under either state or federal law"); Forbes v. Lucas (In re
Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 598 (6th Cir.) (stating that "debtor's interests in an ER-
ISA-qualified pension plan are not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate"),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d
1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990)(indicating that exemption allowed under § 541(c)(2)
"suggests no limitation to state spendthrift trust law").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that an
ERISA-qualified pension plan "is a spendthrift trust under Indiana law and
therefore not included in the bankruptcy estate." In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330,
331 (7th Cir. 1990).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). Section 541 provides in
pertinent part:
(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an inter-
est of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate....
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is en-
forceable in a case under this title.
Id. § 541(c)(l)-(2) (emphasis added).
5. For an analysis of the legislative history of § 541 (c)(2) and the meaning
of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law," see infra notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text.
6. The federal statutes to which this Casebrief will refer are § 401 (a)(13) of
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and § 1056(d)(1) of ERISA. Under
§ 401 (a) (13)(A), "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section
unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)(A)
(1988). Under § 1056(d)(1), "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1).(1988). To be an ERISA-qualified plan, the pension plan must,
among other things, prohibit the assignment or alienation of benefits. See id.
Upon meeting the ERISA criteria, the plan gains tax-exempt status under
2
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spendthrift trusts created under state law. 7
In Velis v. Kardanis,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit considered whether an individual's ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan, Keogh plan9 and Individual Retirement Account (IRA)1 0 were
§ 401(a)(13) of the IRC. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13). For a discussion of Congress'
intent in the promulgation of ERISA, see supra note 3.
7. A spendthrift trust is a creation of state law and is essentially "a trust
created to provide a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary, with only a cer-
tain portion of the total amount to be distributed at any one time." Goff, 706
F.2d at 580. Under state spendthrift law, the settlor places restrictions upon the
trust "which operate in most states to place the fund beyond the reach of the
beneficiary's creditors, as well as to secure the fund against the beneficiary's own
improvidence." Id. In addition, almost every state requires that the trust be
established for the benefit of an individual other than the person creating the
trust. Newell, supra note 3, at 202.
A spendthrift trust created for the benefit of the person creating the trust is
considered a "self-settled" trust. Id. Under state spendthrift trust law, a self-
settled trust is not entitled to the restrictions upon alienation and assignment
granted to other spendthrift trusts. Id. at 203. The exclusion of these restric-
tions from a self-settled trust was imposed to prevent debtors from shielding
their assets from their creditors. Id.
State law is not uniform with respect to the criteria neccessary to establish a
spendthrift trust. Goff, 706 F.2d at 580. In all states, however, the determinative
factor in finding that a spendthrift trust is self-settled is whether the trust is
funded by the beneficiary. Newell, supra note 3, at 203.
The determination of which trusts are excluded by § 541 (c)(2) is contingent
upon the court's interpretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Velis, 949 F.2d at 81. For the context of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" in § 541 (c)(2), see supra note 4. For a discussion of the three distinct inter-
pretations of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," see infra" notes 36-55 and accom-
panying text.
8. 949 F.2d 78 (3d. Cir. 1991). For a further discussion of Velis, see infra
notes 56-99 and accompanying text.
9. Keogh plans are ERISA-qualified retirement savings plans which are
available for a self-employed sole proprietor or a partner. Grotberg, Comment,
supra note 3, at 169. One of the ERISA-imposed requirements on a Keogh plan
is the inclusion of anti-alienation and assignment provisions. Velis, 949 F.2d at
79-80. Like other ERISA-qualified savings plans, contributions to Keogh plans
are tax-free until the participant receives distributions from the plan. Grotberg,
Comment, supra note 3, at 170. An individual is permitted to make withdrawals
from the plan beginning at age 591/2. Id. However, a Keogh plan participant is
not required to make withdrawals until he or she attains the age of 701/2. Id. If
funds are withdrawn before the specified age requirements, they are subject to a
10% tax penalty. Id.
Under state spendthrift trust law, Keogh plans are considered self-settled
trusts. Newell, supra note 3, at 203. Because the Keogh plan is established by
the self-employed for his or her own benefit, the plan fails to qualify as a spend-
thrift trust. Id. For a discussion of self-settled trusts, see supra note 7.
10. An IRA is another form of an ERISA-qualified retirement savings plan.
Grotberg, Comment, supra note 3, at 171. Made available to virtually any work-
ing individual, an IRA is considered a supplemental form of retirement savings.
Id. IRAs are similar to Keogh plans in that they are subject to the same age
limitations and premature withdrawal penalties as Keogh plans. Id. at 172. An
important distinction between IRAs and Keogh plans, however, is that ERISA
does not require that IRAs have anti-alienation or assignment provisions. Velis,
3
Boyd: Bankruptcy Law - The Exemption of ERISA-Qualified Plans from the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
exempt from his bankruptcy estate under § 541 (c) (2)."1 The Velis court
held that retirement savings plans, with restrictions upon alienation and
assignment enforceable under federal statute, are entitled to the same
status as state spendthrift trusts and, therefore, are exempt from the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.12 Thus, by including ERISA under the um-
brella of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the Third Circuit has pro-
vided federally regulated retirement savings plans the protection
Congress envisioned in its promulgation of ERISA and the Code.' 3
To properly understand the Third Circuit's holding in Velis and its
accompanying impact upon a bankrupt individual's ERISA-qualified sav-
ings plan, one must first be familiar with the Code's valuation of the
bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, the next section of this Casebrief exam-
ines the bankruptcy estate and the exemptions which the Code allows in
creating the estate. 14 This Casebrief next discusses how other circuit
courts have applied § 541(c)(2) in the context of ERISA-qualified sav-
ings plans. 15 Finally, this Casebrief discusses and analyzes the Velis
court's holding and the case's impact upon ERISA-qualified savings
plans. 16
II. VALUATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
The Code provides under § 541 (a) that at the commencement of a
bankruptcy case, the debtor's bankruptcy estate is established.' 7 Essen-
949 F.2d at 82. For a discussion of Keogh plans, see supra note 9. For a discus-
sion of the Velis court's application of § 541 (c) (2) to IRAs, see infra notes 75-99
and accompanying text.
11. Velis, 949 F.2d at 79. The question of the status of retirement savings
plans regulated by federal statute was one of first impression for the Velis court.
Id.
12. Id. at 82. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that it was "reasonable to
conclude that Congress intended to provide protection against the claims of
creditors for a person's interest in pension plans," which would include retire-
ment savings plans governed by federal statute. Id.
13. For a discussion of ERISA and its policies, see supra note 3. For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Velis and its impact upon ERISA-quali-
fled savings plans, see infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Code's valuation of the bankruptcy estate, see
infra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the three distinct views on the application of the
§ 541 (c)(2) to ERISA-qualified savings plans, see infra notes 36-56 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For a discussion of the Velis court's holding, see infra notes 57-99 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the impact of Velis on ERISA-qualified
savings plans, see infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1988). Section 541 establishes the bankruptcy es-
tate, which includes virtually all of the debtor's assets. Grotberg, Comment,
supra note 3, at 177. This section provides in part:
§ 541. Property of the estate
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held:
862 [Vol. 37: p. 859
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tially, the estate is composed of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." a1 8 The Code,
however, does allow certain property interests of the debtor to be ex-
cluded from the bankruptcy estate and thus remain under the posses-
sion and control of the debtor during and after the bankruptcy case. 19
Under the precursor to the Code, the Bankruptcy Act (Act), the
bankruptcy estate was comprised of the debtor's property which fell
within the definition of "transferability or leviability. '" 20 In contrast,
under the Code, the bankruptcy estate includes all property interests of
the debtor and then permits the debtor to "exempt property needed for
a fresh start."' 2 1 This change in the formation of the bankruptcy estate
was enacted to remedy the deficiencies of the Act.22 Accordingly, § 541
was "intended to be broad in scope."'2 3
To provide for the debtor's fresh start, § 522 provides for certain
property to be exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 24 Under
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this sec-
tion, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C § 541(a)(1). For the text of the exclusion allowed under subsection
(c)(2) of § 541, see supra note 4.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
19. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541(c)(2) (1988) (exemption and exclusion provi-
sions of the Code, respectively). For a discussion of § 522 and its exemption of
assets from the bankruptcy estate, see infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of § 541(c)(2) and its exclusion of assets from the bankruptcy
estate, see infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
20. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
Property which "could not be transferred or levied upon under state law" did
not even enter the bankruptcy estate under the Act. Id.
21. Id.
22. Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983). Specifi-
cally, Congress concluded that the convoluted analysis required under the Act to
determine the bankruptcy estate represented a deficiency in the statute. Id. The
new Code simplified the determination of the estate by including all property
interests of the debtor. Id. This eliminated the "analytical conundrum" that the
courts used under the Act. Id.
23. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d at 600 (citing United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275
(1991).
24. See II U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988). Section 522(b) provides in part:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may ex-
empt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph
(1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection .... Such
property is -
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under para-
graph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize;
or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable
on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the
debtor's domicile has been located ....
1992] 863
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§ 522(b), the debtor must select one of two mutually exclusive exemp-
tion plans: the federal exemption plan provided under § 522(b)(1) or
the federal, state and local exemption plan allowed under § 522(b)(2). 2 5
The federal exemption plan available under § 522(b)(1) limits the
debtor's exemptions to the federal exemptions explictly delineated in
§ 522(d). 26
A debtor can elect to opt out of the federal exemption plan pro-
vided by § 522(b)(1) and instead elect to proceed under the exemption
plan provided by § 522(b)(2).2 7 Section 522(b)(2)(A) provides that "any
property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this
section, or State or local law" is exempt from the bankruptcy estate.28
This allows the debtor to evaluate which valuation of the bankruptcy
Id. § 522(b)(l)-(2)(A).
25. Id. § 522(b)(l)-(2). For the text of § 522(b)(1) and (2), see supra note
24. The federal exemptions allowed under § 522(b)(1) are delineated in
§ 522(d)(1)-(1 1). Id. § 522(d). For example, § 522(d)(1) allows the debtor to
exclude up to $7,500 of the debtor's residence from the bankruptcy estate. Id.
§ 522(d)(1). In addition, included in § 522(d)(10) is the provision for the ex-
emption of certain pension plan payouts. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E). The debtor is
entitled to payments from a qualified plan "to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor." Id. The section does not specifically protect the
principal or corpus of the plan; rather, it only protects the debtor's right to re-
tain such reasonable distributions from the plan. Id.
To qualify as a pension plan under § 522(d)(10)(E), the Code requires that
the plan meet the criteria of "§ [§ ] 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409" of the
IRC. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E)(iii). It should be noted that ERISA-qualified plans also
meet the criteria of § 401(a) of the IRC. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). A debtor electing to proceed under the federal
exemption plan cannot take advantage of any other federal exemptions beyond
those exemptions listed in § 522(d). Id. In addition, the federal exemption plan
forces the debtor to forego any state or local exemptions. Id. For the text of
§ 522(b)(1), see supra note 24.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). An important element of this section's exemption
plans is the mutually exclusive nature of the two options. See id. § 522(b). Fed-
eral exemptions that are available under § 522(b)(1) are not available under
§ 522(b)(2) and vice-versa. Id. For the text of § 522(b)(1) and § 522(b)(2), see
supra note 24.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 522(b)(2)(A) al-
lows the debtor to take advantage of any state or local law which provides ex-
emptions from the bankruptcy estate. Id. In addition, any property which is
exempt under federal law, other than the property listed in § 522(d), is also ex-
empt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Id. For an example of the federal
exemptions granted by § 522(d), see supra note 25. Unfortunately, the text of
§ 522(b)(2)(A) does not specify the applicable federal law to which it refers. For
the text of § 522(b)(2)(A), see supra note 24. The legislative history accompany-
ing § 522(b)(2)(A), however, does provide an illustrative list of the applicable
federal law envisioned by Congress in enacting § 522(b)(2)(A). See Samore v.
Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1984). The list in-
cludes Social Security payments and other federally funded benefits; it does not
include ERISA-qualified pension plans. Id. at 1274. While this list is not in-
tended to be exclusive, the Graham court, relying upon this legislative history,
found that ERISA was "not a 'Federal law' upon which a § 522(b)(2) (A) exemp-
tion could be based." Id.
6
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estate "would permit him to retain a larger share of his assets": the fed-
eral exemptions allowed under § 522(d) or the federal, state and local
exemptions allowed under § 522(b)(2). 2 9
As mentioned above, § 522 removes property that has already been
included in the bankruptcy estate; section 541 (c) (2) operates to exclude
certain trusts from the bankruptcy estate altogether.3 0  Under
§ 541 (c)(2), a debtor can exclude from the bankruptcy estate his interest
in a trust which has restrictions upon its transfer that are "enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law."'' s Unfortunately, Congress did not
define the scope of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in the
text of the Code.3 2
The legislative history accompanying § 541(c)(2) provides some
guidance concerning what is included under the umbrella of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." The House Report stated that "[p]aragraph (2) of
subsection (c) ... preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust
to the extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law."13 3 Thus, while the legislative history does not ex-
plictly exclude federal law from the scope of "applicable nonbankruptcy
law," it specifically includes trusts enforceable under state spendthrift
trust laws within the scope of § 541 (c) (2).34 Because neither the statute
nor the legislative history definitively establish the intended scope of the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the federal circuit courts have
been required to define the scope of the exclusion allowed under
29. Goffv. Taylor.(In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 579 (5th Cir. 1983). For ex-
ample, most states allow a larger exemption for the debtor's residence than is
allowed under § 522(d)(1). Id. at 577. If the total value of all the federal exemp-
tions allowed under § 522(d) is less than the total value of exemptions allowed
under § 522(b)(2), then the debtor will probably take advantage of the federal,
state and local exemptions allowed under § 522(b)(2). Id.
30. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). For the
text of § 541(c)(2), see supra note 4.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (emphasis added). Determining the meaning of
the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" gave rise to the controversy in Velis
v. Kardanis, the focus of this Casebrief. For various interpretations of this
phrase, see infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). For the text of § 541(c)(2), see supra note 4.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 2, at 369, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6325.
34. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1479 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Moore court noted that the legislative history only identified state spend-
thrift trusts as one of the items included under "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Id. For a further discussion of the Moore court's interpretation of the legislative
history and its impact upon the scope of § 541(c)(2), see infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
Other circuit courts have held that the legislative history indicates Con-
gress' intent to limit "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust
law. See, e.g., Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 1983). For a
further discussion of these courts' interpretations of the legislative history and
its impact upon the scope of § 541(c)(2), see infra notes 39-47 and accompany-
ing text.
8651992]
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§ 541(c)(2). 3 5
III. THE SCOPE OF "APPLICABLE NONBANKRUPTCY LAW"
To date, nine circuit courts have considered the scope of the phrase
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as referenced in § 541(c)(2). As a re-
sult, three distinct views on the phrase's application have developed.
Four of the circuits have narrowly interpreted the phrase, limiting its
application to pension plans enforceable as state spendthrift trusts.
36
On the other hand, four other circuits, including the Third Circuit, have
broadly interpreted "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as exempting trusts
with restrictions upon alienation and assignment which are enforceable
under either state or federal law.3 7 Finally, the Seventh Circuit has
avoided the interpretational analysis of "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
by holding that all ERISA-qualified pension plans are spendthrift trusts
under Indiana law and, therefore, are excluded from the bankruptcy
estate.
38
A. The Narrow Interpretation View
The narrow interpretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" was first espoused by the Fifth Circuit in In re Goff.3 9 The Goff court
reached its conclusion by applying a three-step analysis. First, the court
examined the "explicitly narrow legislative intent behind the facially
broad reference in Section 541 (c)(2) to 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' "
and concluded that Congress intended the exclusion under § 541(c)(2)
to be narrowly interpreted. 40 Second, the court considered the broad
35. For a list of circuit court holdings and their interpretations of "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law," see supra note 3.
36. For a discussion of the circuit courts which have narrowly interpreted
§ 541 (c)(2), see infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the circuit courts which have broadly interpreted
§ 541(c)(2), see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
38. In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1990). Indiana state law spe-
cifically mentions § 1056(d) of ERISA, which restricts the alienation and assign-
ment of ERISA-qualified savings plans in defining spendthrift trusts. Id.; see 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). Accordingly, the LeFeber court held that an ERISA-
qualified savings plan was a spendthrift trust and excluded by § 541(c)(2) from
the bankruptcy estate. LeFeber, 906 F.2d at 331. For a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's view, see infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
39. 706 F.2d 574, 576 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that it was first circuit court
to determine the scope of phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law"). The debt-
ors in Goff were a husband and wife who had voluntarily filed a Chapter 7 peti-
tion for bankruptcy. Id. at 577. The trust at issue in the Goff case was an ERISA-
qualified Keogh plan in which both debtors had made contributions. Id. At the
time the Goffs filed for bankruptcy, their Keogh plan was valued at over $90,000,
of which nearly $3,000 had been contributed three days prior to filing for bank-
ruptcy. Id. No withdrawals were ever made by the Goffs. Id. For a discussion of
Keogh plans, see supra note 9.
40. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581. The Goff court determined that a review of the
legislative history of § 541(c)(2) revealed that Congress intended to narrowly
[Vol. 37: p. 859866
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congressional policies envisioned in the promulgation of the Code and
determined that the legislative history's failure to mention ERISA in its
list of federal law under § 522(b)(2)(A) indicated Congress' intention to
exclude ERISA-qualified pension plans from § 522(b)(2)(A). 4 1 Finally,
the court evaluated the Code's goal concerning ERISA and concluded
that the Code's goal to broaden the bankruptcy estate would be eviscer-
ated by broadly interpreting the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law."'4 2 Other circuits that have adopted this narrow interpretation of
apply the exclusion provided by the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Id.; see also Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 n.3
(11th Cir. 1985) ("Both House and Senate reports expressly limit section
541(c)(2) to spendthrift trusts."); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d
1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984) ("There is no indication whatever that Congress in-
tended § 541(c)(2) to be a broad exclusion which would apply to . . . ERISA
plan[s].").
The House and Senate reports' explanation of § 541(c)(2) was the disposi-
tive factor in the Goff court's determination. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581. For a discus-
sion of the legislative history accompanying § 541(c)(2), see supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text. According to the Goff court, the legislative history of
both congressional houses indicates that § 541 (c)(2) was enacted to continue the
exclusion of the "debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is pro-
tected from creditors under applicable State law." Goff, 706 F.2d at 581 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6136). The court noted that the legislative history indicated that § 541 (c)(2) was
included in the Code to continue the old Bankruptcy Act's exclusion of spend-
thrift trusts: "Section 541(c)(2) 'preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spend-
thrift trust... enforceable [under] nonbankruptcy law.' " Id. at 582 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5869).
Under the Act, state spendthrift trusts were explicitly excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581 n.19. Also, a creditor was not allowed
access to a trust unless the debtor's interest in the trust was "alienable or amena-
ble" under local law. Id. By definition, spendthrift trusts are not "alienable or
amenable" under local law. Id. For a discussion of spendthrift trust law, see
supra note 7.
The Goff court held that despite § 541(c)(2)'s "facially broad reference to
'applicable nonbankruptcy law[,]' " Congress intended its application to be lim-
ited to state spendthrift trusts. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581. The Goff court rejected the
debtor's claim that § 541 (c) (2) should be interpreted broadly to incorporate ER-
ISA-qualified savings plans. Id.
41. Goff, 706 F.2d at 585. The court noted that the trusts listed under the
legislative history accompanying § 522(b)(2)(A) were either "public[ly] funded
and/or created pension and welfare systems" or a "few exceptional, traditionally
guarded industries." Id. at 586. Examples include pensions paid to the winners
of the Congressional Medal of Honor and wages paid to seamen. Id. at 586
nn.31-32. Based on these observations, the Goff court concluded Congress did
not intend the Code to provide any preferential treatment to ERISA-qualified
pension plans. Id. at 586. The court acknowledged that the application of
§ 522(b)(2)(A) was not involved in the case at bar; however, the court noted that
consideration of the applicable federal law under § 522(b)(2)(A) would be
"helpful" in determining the scope of § 541(c)(2). Id. at 582. For a discussion
of § 522(b)(2)(A) and its accompanying exemptions, see supra notes 24-29 and
accompanying text.
42. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581. The Goff court noted that it was the Code's intent
"to broaden the 'property of the estate' available to creditors" and to "limit any
9
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§ 541(c)(2) have followed the reasoning of the Goff court.43
Consequently, under the narrow interpretation view, "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" only includes pension plans which are enforceable
under state spendthrift trust law. 44 Accordingly, ERISA-qualified sav-
ings plans that also meet the criteria of the debtor's state spendthrift
trust laws will be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 45 However, cer-
tain ERISA-qualified plans, such as Keogh plans,4 6 will not qualify as
spendthrift trusts and, therefore, will not be excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate by those courts embracing the narrow interpretation
view. 47
B. The Broad Interpretation View
Four circuits, including the Third Circuit, have broadly interpreted
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include trusts with restrictions upon
alienation and assignment which are enforceable under either federal or
exemptions of pension funds." Id. at 587. The court based its interpretation of
the congressional intent in promulgating of § 541 (c)(2) upon the legislative his-
tory accompanying the Code. Id. at 578.
The legislative history accompanying § 541 notes that "[t]he scope of this
paragraph is broad." S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. In addition, the legislative history indicates
that "[s]ubsection (c) [of § 541] invalidates restrictions on the transfer of prop-
erty of the debtor, in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will
become property of the estate." Id. at 83. According to the Goffcourt, a broad
interpretation of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" would frustrate this intent of
the Code. Goff, 706 F.2d at 587. The court noted that it was axiomatic that while
ERISA was intended to preempt state law, ERISA was not intended to "super-
sede any law of the United States [except pre-existing federal pension law]." Id.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982)). Therefore, the Goff court held that the
Code superseded any conflict between itself and ERISA. Id. For a discussion of
the valuation of the bankruptcy estate, see supra notes 17-35 and accompanying
text.
43. See, e.g., Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352,
1360 (9th Cir. 1985) (following Goff court in narrowly interpreting "applicable
nonbankruptcy law"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11 th Cir. 1985) (agreeing with Goff
court that Congress did not intend to exempt ERISA-qualified plans under
§ 541(c)(2)); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir.
1984) (characterizing court's own analysis of ERISA-qualified pension plan as
"analogous" to Goff court's analysis of ERISA-qualified Keogh plan).
44. Goff, 706 F.2d at 587. In narrowly interpreting § 541(c)(2), the Goff
court held that all ERISA-qualified plans are not automatically included in the
bankruptcy estate. Id. Rather, the determinative factor was whether the ERISA-
qualified plan would also qualify as a state spendthrift trust. Id. If an ERISA-
qualified plan did qualify as a spendthrift trust under state law, then the plan
would be excluded by § 541(c)(2). Id.
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of Keogh plans and why they do not qualify as spend-
thrift trusts, see supra note 9.
47. Goff, 706 F.2d at 588. The court noted that under spendthrift trust law,
Keogh plans were self-settled trusts and therefore were not excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. Id.
10
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state law.48 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
first established this broad interpretation of § 541(c)(2) in In re Moore.4 9
The Moore court based its decision upon several factors: the plain lan-
guage of § 541 (c)(2), 50 Congress' specific reference to state law in other
sections of the Code, 5 1 and the lack of conclusive evidence in the legisla-
tive history of the Code. 52 Thus, circuit courts aligned with this broad
interpretation view have permitted the debtor to exclude all ERISA-
qualified plans from the bankruptcy estate under the auspices of
§ 541 (c) (2).
C. The Seventh Circuit's View
As previously discussed, courts espousing the narrow interpretation
view reasoned that an ERISA-qualified plan must be enforceable under
48. See Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that "a tax-qualified ERISA pension or profit sharing plan is ex-
empt from the bankruptcy estate under [section] 541(c)(2)"); Velis v. Kardanis,
949 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d
597, 603 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); Anderson v. Raine
(In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1480 (4th Cir. 1990) (same). For a discussion of
the Velis court's interpretation of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," see infra
notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
49. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). The debtors in Moore were employees of
Spring Industries, Inc., which was located in South Carolina. Id. at 1476. The
employees were participants in the company's comprehensive retirement pro-
gram which consisted of a profit sharing plan and a retirement savings plan. Id.
at 1477. Both of these plans were ERISA-qualified plans and therefore con-
tained the ERISA-required provisions prohibiting alienation or assignment. Id.
50. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477. The Fourth Circuit held that " '[applicable
nonbankruptcy law' means precisely what it says: all laws, state and federal,
under which a transfer restriction is enforceable." Id. The court also noted that
the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is used elsewhere in the Code to
refer to both state and federal law. Id. Accordingly, "[i]t is incongruous to give
the same phrase in § 541 (c)(2) a narrower construction than the identical phrase
in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 1478.
51. Id. The Moore court noted that in other provisions of the Code, "when
Congress intended to refer to state law, it did so explicitly." Id. For example,
under § 109(c)(2), only debtors qualified under "State law" can file for Chapter
9. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988) ("An entity may be a debtor under
chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity ... is generally authorized to be a
debtor under such chapter by State law."). In addition, Congress used the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to refer to both state and federal law in
other areas of the Code. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478. For example, under
§ 1125(d), the contents of post-petition' disclosure statements are " 'not gov-
erned by any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law' which includes, inter alia,
federal securities law." Id. at 1477-78. Accordingly, the Moore court concluded
that if Congress had intended to limit § 541(c)(2) to state law, the Code would
have explicitly stated that limitation. Id.
52. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479. The Moore court first noted that it was inap-
propriate to refer to the legislative history of § 541(c)(2) because the language
of this section is clear. Id. at 1478. Nevertheless, the court examined the legisla-
tive history and determined that Congress did not intend "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" to refer exclusively to state spendthrift trust law. Id. at 1479.
11
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applicable state spendthrift trust law before it can be excluded under
§ 541(c)(2). 5 3 In In re LeFeber,5 4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit avoided this analytical step by holding that all ER-
ISA-qualified plans are state spendthrift trusts and thus qualify as exclu-
sions under either the narrow or broad interpretation of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." '55
IV. CASE ANALYSIS: VELIS V. KARDANIS
Against this backdrop of disagreement among the circuit courts, the
Third Circuit considered the issue of whether § 541(c)(2) excluded an
ERISA-qualified pension plan, Keogh plan and IRA from a bankrupt's
estate in Velis v. Kardanis.56
A. Facts and Procedural History
The debtor in Velis was a physician employed by a professional cor-
poration (PC) of which he was the sole stockholder. 5 7 The PC had es-
tablished a pension plan for all of its employees. 58 In addition, the PC
created a Keogh plan and an IRA for the benefit of the debtor and a
separate IRA for the benefit of the debtor's wife. 59 All three plans met
the qualification requirements of § 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) and § 1056(d)(1) of ERISA, both of which require the inclu-
sion of provisions in the plan documents prohibiting the assignment or
alienation of benefits from the plans. 60
53. For a discussion of the narrow interpretation view, see supra notes 39-
47 and accompanying text..
54. 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990). The debtor in LeFeber was an Indiana
resident who received a $1,000 per month pension from the Teamsters Central
States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. Id. at 330. The fund was
an ERISA-qualified plan and contained provisions forbidding the assignment of
benefts. Id. Under Indiana state spendthrift trust law, all ERISA-qualified plans
are spendthrift trusts. Id.
55. Id. at 331.
56. 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 79. The debtor owned 100% of the PC's stock and was the only
physician employed by the PC. Id.
58. Id. "In January 1980, the PC established a pension plan for the benefit
of the debtor, his wife and two other employees." Id. At the time he filed for
bankruptcy protection, the debtor's interest in the pension plan was valued at
$184,000. In re Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 501 (Bankr. D.N.J.), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
59. Velis, 949 F.2d at 79. Upon the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy, his
interest in his Keogh Plan was valued at $162,478, and his interest in the IRA
was valued at $9,100. Velis, 123 B.R. at 501.
60. Velis, 949 F.2d at 79-80. In addition, all three plans were ERISA-quali-
fled retirement savings plans. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). For a dis-
cussion of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), see supra note 6 and accompanying text. In
addition, the savings plans were granted tax-exempt status under the IRC. Velis,
949 F.2d at 79-80; see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988). For a discussion of 26
U.S.C. § 401(a)(13), see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
870 [Vol. 37: p. 859
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In August of 1986, the debtor and his wife entered into a contract
to purchase office space in which the PC was located. 6 1 In October of
1986, prior to the closing of the sale, the creditor in Velis obtained a $2.1
million medical malpractice judgment against the debtor.6 2 On Decem-
ber 18, 1986, pursuant to the creditor's efforts to collect the judgment,
the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 63 However, less
than two weeks after filing for bankruptcy, the debtor withdrew money
from the retirement savings plans to meet the payment required under
the newly negotiated contract to purchase the office space.6 4
The creditor in Velis claimed that § 541 (c) (2) did not exclude retire-
ment savings plans regulated by federal statute.6 5 Accordingly, the
creditor maintained that she was entitled to have both the withdrawn
and untouched portions of the savings plans included in Velis' bank-
ruptcy estate. 66 The debtor, on the other hand, claimed that his prop-
erty interests in the various retirement savings plans were excluded from
the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541 (c)(2) and, therefore, not subject
61. Velis, 949 F.2d at 80. The PC was located within two cooperative apart-
ments. Id. The purchase price for the apartments was $775,000. Id. Velis made
a down payment of $77,500. Id. The funds for the down payment were ob-
tained through the sale of the Velis' house in Seabright, New Jersey. Velis, 123
B.R. at 501. Velis also received a commitment from a bank to finance $620,000
of the balance owed on the apartments. Id. The entire balance of the purchase
price, $697,500, was due upon the closing of the purchase contract, which was
scheduled for the end of December. In re Velis, 109 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1989).
62. Velis, 109 B.R. at 66. The creditor in Velis was a patient of Velis' who
had sued him for medical malpractice. Id. The initial judgment against Velis
was $3.7 million; however, the judgment was later reduced to $2.1 million. Id.
Unfortunately for the debtor, his malpractice insurance policy had a limit of $1
million. Id.
63. Id. at 66. By this time, the creditor had already levied against the Velis'
joint bank account, which had a balance of $183,000. Id.
64. Velis, 949 F.2d at 80. Upon learning of the malpractice judgment
against the debtor, the bank cancelled its commitment on the debtor's mort-
gage. Id. The debtor renegotiated the purchase contract for the PC property,
and the bank granted the debtor an extension of the closing date conditioned
upon the payment of $225,500 prior to December 31, 1986. Id. Since the
debtor was unable to obtain financing from an institutional lender, on December
30, 1986, the debtor borrowed $225,500 from his pension plan to meet the re-
quired deposit. In re Velis, 123 B.R. at 501. The debtor made this withdrawal
without the authorization of the bankruptcy court. Id.
In addition, on October 15, 1987, the debtor again borrowed money from
his retirement savings plans but with the authorization of the bankruptcy court.
Velis, 109 B.R. at 66. The debtor borrowed a total of $700,433, of which
$355,578 was removed from the various plans. Velis, 949 F.2d at 80. All of these
funds were used to complete the purchase of the PC's property. Id.
65. Velis, 123 B.R. at 503. The creditor argued that "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" is narrowly limited to state spendthrift trust law and does not in-
clude ERISA. Id. The creditor, therefore, asserted that the ERISA-qualified
plans would be included in the bankruptcy estate. Id.
66. Id.
13
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to the claims of the creditor.67 In finding for the creditor, the bank-
ruptcy court held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was
limited to state spendthrift trust law and, therefore, that the savings
plans were included in the bankruptcy estate.68
In reaching its decision, the bankruptcy court noted that "the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit [had] not yet addressed the meaning of
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' as that phrase is used in § 541(c)(2)." 69
Consequently, the bankruptcy court itself was required to analyze
§ 541(c)(2) and determine the scope of the phrase "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law." '70 In its analysis, the court explicitly rejected the broad
interpretation of the Fourth Circuit in Moore7 ' and held that the exclu-
sion available under § 541(c)(2) was limited to state spendthrift trust
67. Id. The debtor contended that the restrictions upon alienation and as-
signment imposed by ERISA fell within the restrictions envisioned in § 541 (c)(2)
and the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
68. Id. The district court "reject[ed the] debtor's assertion, and [found]
that Congress intended 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' to encompass only state
spendthrift trust law." Id.
69. Id. The bankruptcy court did evaluate the "strong weight of judicial
authority support[ing] the view that [applicable nonbankruptcy law] is synony-
mous with state spendthrift trust law." Id. The court noted that at the time of its
decision, "[flour of the five circuits which have considered the issue have held
that 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' encompasses only state spendthrift trust
law." Id. (citing Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352,
1360 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Gra-
ham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor (In re
Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1983); but see Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore),
907 F.2d 1476, 1477 (4th Cir. 1990)).
The bankruptcy court reached its decision before the Sixth or the Tenth
Circuit had addressed the issue of the interpretation of § 541(c)(2). Both of
these circuit courts rejected the narrow interpretation of "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" and held that state and federal law were included within the scope
of § 541(c)(2). See Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 674 (10th
Cir. 1991)("We do not perceive an ambiguity in the phrase 'applicable nonban-
kruptcy law' that would permit us to differentiate state from federal law. The
phrase on its face is clear and broad."); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d
597, 598 (6th Cir. 1991) ("We reject a narrow interpretation of the phrase 'ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law' in § 541 (c)(2) .... finding that the plain unambigu-
ous language of the statute encompasses federal law other than that arising
under Title 11 as well as state statutory and case law."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2275 (1991).
70. lelis, 123 B.R. at 504. The bankruptcy court first looked to the lan-
guage of the statute and determined that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was
unclear and ambiguous. Id. Accordingly, the court then looked to the legislative
history accompanying the statute. Id. The court determined that the legislative
intent was to limit § 541(c)(2) application to trusts enforceable under state
spendthrift trust laws. Id. For a discussion of other circuit courts' analysis in
adopting the narrow interpretation approach, see supra notes 39-47 and accom-
panying text.
71. For a discussion of the Moore court's holding and its subsequent adop-
tion of the broad interpretation view, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying
text.
14
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law. 72 The court concluded that the ERISA-qualified retirement savings
plans at issue, which did not qualify as spendthrift trusts, were subject to
inclusion in the bankrupt's estate. 7 3 The debtor appealed this decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
7 4
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis of "Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law"
in Velis v. Kardonis
On appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the bankruptcy court's de-
cision and held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in-
cluded federal law. 75 The Third Circuit relied upon several factors to
72. Velis, 123 B.R. at 508. The court considered the Moore reasoning to be
"particularly troubling because of its deceptive appeal." Id. at 506 (emphasis ad-
ded). Primarily, the bankruptcy court disagreed with the Moore court's holding
that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was "plain language." Id. (quoting Ander-
son v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477 (4th Cir. 1990)). On the con-
trary, the bankruptcy court held that "the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law'
is not a term of art capable of uniform meaning, but, rather, is a ubiquitous
catchall phrase." Id. at 507. In addition, the Moore court considered it disposi-
tive that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was used throughout the
Code to refer to both state and federal law. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478. The bank-
ruptcy court characterized this conclusion by the Moore court as "irrelevant" and
concluded that "intra-statutory comparison for the purpose of interpretation of
the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' [was] meaningless." Velis, 123 B.R. at
507.
73. Velis, 123 B.R. at 514. The bankruptcy court concluded that the Keogh
plan and the IRA were, by their definition, self-settled trusts and therefore did
not qualify as spendthrift trusts under New Jersey law. Id. at 509. On the other
hand, the pension plan was an employer-created trust for the benefit of an em-
ployee and technically a spendthrift trust under New Jersey law. Id. The bank-
ruptcy court concluded that because the PC was the "alter ego" of Velis, the
pension should also be considered a self-settled trust. Id. For a discussion of
self-settled trusts and why they do not qualify as spendthrift trusts, see supra
note 7.
74. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Velis, see infra notes
75-99 and accompanying text.
75. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991). In reaching its deci-
sion, the Velis court noted that four of the five circuits that had considered the
issue of § 541(c)(2) had "narrowly construed the term 'applicable nonban-
kruptcy law' as used in § 541(c)(2) to encompass only state spendthrift trust
law." Id. at 80. For a discussion of the circuit court cases that have narrowly
interpreted § 541(c)(2), see supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text. The Velis
court also noted that the bankruptcy courts within the Third Circuit were split
on the scope of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law," with a majority of
the courts favoring the narrow interpretation view. Velis, 949 F.2d at 80; see, e.g.,
In re Atallah, 95 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that "[tihe term
'applicable non-bankruptcy law' in § 541(c)(2) refers to state spendthrift trust
law"); accord In re Hysick, 90 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Heisey,
88 B.R. 47, 51 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988); White v. Babo (In re Babo), 81 B.R. 389,
391 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); B.K. Medical Sys., Inc. Pension Plan v. Roberts (In
re Roberts), 81 B.R. 354, 374 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). But see Bentz v. Sawdy (In
re Sawdy), 49 B.R. 383, 386 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that money in state-
mandated and controlled public school employees' retirement fund was ex-
cluded by § 541(c)(2) from becoming part of bankruptcy estate); Liscinski v.
Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 B.R. 181, 191 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (noting that "refer-
15
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reach its decision.
First, the court found the language of § 541(c) (2) of the Code to be
unambiguous. 76 Specifically, the court concluded that the "term 'en-
forceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law' is not in the least ambig-
uous, and cannot reasonably be interpreted as 'enforceable under
applicable state spendthrift-trust law.' -77 The court concluded that, on
its face, the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is not limited to
state spendthrift trust law. 7 8
The second determinative factor the Velis court noted was that the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is used elsewhere in the Code to
refer to both state and federal law.7 9 For example, § 108(a), (b) and (c)
of the Code contains "the phrase [applicable law] to toll the statute of
limitations for both federal and state law claims."180 In addition,
§ 365(n)(1)(B) and § 1125(d) of the Code use the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" to refer to federal copyright laws and federal secur-
ities laws, respectively. 8 1 Therefore, according to the Velis court, the use
of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in other sections of the
ence of 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in section 541 (c)(2) ... refer[s] to all law
that might normally apply outside of bankruptcy proceedings, including ER-
ISA"). Despite a majority of bankruptcy courts adopting a narrow interpreta-
tion, the Third Circuit concluded that § 541(c)(2) encompassed federal law.
Velis, 949 F.2d at 82. The Velis court found the reasoning of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit in Moore to be persuasive. Id. For a discussion of
the Moore court's adoption of the broad interpretation view, see supra notes 48-
52 and accompanying text.
76. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81. The court first noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that
statutory interpretation properly begins with the language of the statute itself."
Id. Accordingly, "[t]here is no need to resort to legislative history unless the
statutory language is ambiguous." Id.
77. Id. In contrast, the bankruptcy court had concluded that "[r]ecourse to
the common meaning of the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in§ 541 (c) (2) does not resolve the inherent ambiguity generated by the word 'ap-
plicable.' " Velis, 123 B.R. at 504.
78. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81.
79. Id. In justifying its excursion into other sections of the Code, the court
stated:
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
the remainder of the statutory scheme-[either] because the same ter-
minology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear,
or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substan-
tive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.
Id. (quoting United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). The bankruptcy court rejected this reasoning. In re
Velis, 123 B.R. at 507. For a discussion of the bankruptcy court's conclusion, see
supra note 73.
80. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81. The phrase "applicable law" is used in subsec-
tions (a) and (b) of § 108 to define the statute of limitations for a trustee of a
debtor to preserve the debtor's legal claims and is used in subsection (c) to pre-
serve the creditor's legal claims. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)-(c) (1988). The legislative
history specifically mentions the federal tax code as falling within the scope of
"applicable law." Velis, 949 F.2d at 81.
81. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81.
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Code to specifically include both state and federal law is evidence that
Congress intended the phrase to encompass all applicable laws, whether
state or federal.8 2
The third basis for the Velis court's conclusion was Congress' ex-
plicit reference to state or federal law in other sections of the Code when
such a limitation was intended.8 3 As an example, the court noted that
other code sections, such as § 522(b)(1) and (2), explicitly specify fed-
eral or state law when such a distinction is intended.8 4 Therefore, the
Velis court suggested that if Congress had intended "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" to mean "applicable state spendthrift trust law" in
§ 541(c)(2), it would have specifically included such language of limita-
tion in the text of § 541(c)(2).8 5
The fourth factor noted by the Velis court was that the legislative
history of the Code fails to limit the application of § 541(c)(2) to state
spendthrift trusts.8 6 The court determined that the legislative history's
mention of spendthrift trust law does not indicate congressional intent
to exclude all other law.8 7
Finally, the court concluded that based upon the enactment of the
federal statutes for ERISA, Keogh plans and IRAs, Congress had a
"deep and continuing interest in the preservation of pension plans, and
in encouraging retirement savings." 88 In order to preserve these con-
gressional interests, the Velis court determined that Congress must have
intended "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to be broadly interpreted in
§ 541(c)(2) to encompass those federal statutes.89
Once the Velis court determined that the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" included federal law, the court considered each of
the debtor's retirement savings plans to determine which of these plans
were subject to restrictions under federal law which could be character-
ized as "applicable nonbankruptcy law." To the extent that any portion
of one of the debtor's plans was subject to such federal restrictions,
§ 541(c)(2) would apply, excluding that portion of the plan from the
82. Id. at 82.
83. Id. at 81. The Velis court determined that "Congress made clear its abil-
ity to specify either state or federal law when such limitation was intended." Id.
84. Id. For a discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), see supra notes 24-29 and
accompanying text.
85. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81.
86. Id. The court based its interpretation of the legislative history of the
Code on the reasoning of the Moore court. Id. at 82. The Velis court agreed "that
[while] Congress intended to preserve the protections afforded by state spend-
thrift trust laws, the legislative history plainly does not establish that that was the
only purpose intended to be accomplished by § 541 (c)(2)." Id. (citing Anderson
v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990)). For a discussion of
Moore, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
87. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81.
88. Id. at 82. This is reflected by Congress' promulgation of the federal
statutes which provide for "ERISA, Keogh plans and IRAs." Id.
89. Id.
87519921
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debtor's bankruptcy estate.90
The court first scrutinized the debtor's IRA account to determine if
federal law regulated the account to the extent required to exclude this
asset from the debtor's bankruptcy estate.9 1 The court noted that ER-
ISA does not require the inclusion of anti-alienation or assignment pro-
visions in an IRA governing instrument.9 2 Accordingly, the debtor's
IRA account had "no enforceable restrictions, under any 'nonban-
kruptcy law' or otherwise." The court determined that the language of
§ 541(c)(2) did not operate to exclude the IRA from Velis' bankruptcy
estate; therefore, the account was available to creditors.9 3
The court then turned to the debtor's pension plans and Keogh
plan.94 While these plans were both ERISA-qualified plans containing
the requisite anti-alienation and assignment provisions, the Velis court
bifurcated the plans into two distinct segments: the portion of the plan's
assets that had already been distributed to the debtor and the portion of
the plan's assets which had not been distributed to the debtor. As to the
assets already distributed to the debtor, the court posited that once the
debtor removed these funds from the plans, they were no longer subject
to the anti-alienation and assignment restrictions.9 5 Instead, the funds
were in the "unrestricted possession" of the debtor and, therefore, were
neither part of the plans' assets nor subject to any significant federal
nonbankruptcy law. 96 Accordingly, the court concluded that the distrib-
90. Id.
91. Id. For a general discussion of IRAs, see supra note 10.
92. Velis, 949 F.2d at 82. The court also noted that at the time the debtor
filed the bankruptcy petition, he was 63 years of age and could therefore with-
draw funds from his IRA without any penalty. Id. The court did not indicate,
however, whether an IRA account, with an enforceable penalty for withdrawal
still in effect, would be a trust with restrictions upon transfer as required by
§ 541(c)(2).
93. Id. The court noted that the payout from the IRA was still "susceptible
to possible exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E)," at least to the extent reasonably
necessary to support the debtor and his dependents. Id. For a discussion of the
exemption allowed under § 522(d)(10)(E), see supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
94. Velis, 949 F.2d at 82. The pension plan and the Keogh plan were both
ERISA-qualified and contained the requisite language prohibiting the assign-
ment or alienation of benefits. Id. at 79.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The Velis court concluded that the
language of § 541 (c)(2) requires the recognition of restrictions upon the trans-
fer of trust funds which are enforceable under either state or federal law. Velis,
949 F.2d at 82. For the text of § 541 (c)(2), see supra note 4. However, the court
noted that § 541(c)(2) "does not operate to require non-recognition of transfers
which have already occurred, nor does it apply to assets in the possession of the
debtor without restrictions." Velis, 949 F.2d at 82.
96. Velis, 949 F.2d at 82. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
the funds were used to purchase property for the debtor's own purposes. Id. If
the funds had been used to purchase an asset for the pension plan, the asset
would still possess the restrictions upon alienation or assignment imposed by
ERISA. Id.
876
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uted portions of the plans were part of the bankruptcy estate and not
excludable under § 541(c)(2). 9 7 -As to the undistributed assets in the
plans, the court concluded that such assets still possess the ERISA re-
strictions on their transfer. 98 These assets, therefore, are subject in
their entirety to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as comptemplated
under § 541(c)(2) and are thus excluded from the bankruptcy estate.9 9
V. THE IMPACT OF Velis
The Velis court's holding reflects the modern trend of courts to in-
terpret "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in a broad manner and to allow
§ 541 (c)(2) exclusions under either federal or state "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law."' 0 0 While such a broad interpretation of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" provides "uniform treatment of benefits through-
out the country," it also raises additional questions.' 0 ' Specifically,
three questions are left unanswered: one, the standard of restriction
that is necessary to qualify as "applicable nonbankruptcy law"; two, the
use of pension plan funds to purchase assets for the funds; and three,
the use of the retirment savings plan as a conduit to defraud
creditors. '
0 2
By providing "uniform treatment of benefits," the Third Circuit has
guaranteed security for an individual in his retirement savings.'
0 3
97. Id. The court concluded that the assets which have been distributed to
the debtor are no longer subject to the restrictions imposed under ERISA and,
therefore, are no longer entitled to the protections available under ERISA. Id.
Such distributed assets do not fall under the category of property subject to
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 83. The court concluded that "any undistributed assets in the
pension plan and Keogh plan ... may be excluded under § 541(c)(2) unless
there is some other basis for challenge." Id. The court had previously noted
that the trusts would always be open to a challenge of fraud on the part of the
debtor. Id. at 82. Accordingly, if a creditor can prove that there were substantial
payments made to the retirement savings plans in an effort to defraud the credi-
tor, the court would hold such conveyances void. Id. The court acknowledged
that fraud was not an issue in Velis. Id.
100. Of the nine circuits that have examined the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law," the four most recent cases have held that its application is
not limited to state spendthrift trusts. See, e.g., Gladwell v. Harline (In re Har-
line), 950 F.2d 669, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e do not find a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to limit the meaning of § 541(c)(2) exclusively to
state-recognized spendthrift trusts."); Velis, 949 F.2d at 83; Forbes v. Lucas (In re
Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2275 (1991); Ander-
son v. Raine (In re Moore), 908 F.2d 1476, 1480 (4th Cir. 1990). The approach
adopted by these courts represents a broad interpretation of the concept of "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
101. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 603.
102. Id. The Lucas court noted that a broad interpretation of § 541(c)(2)
provided uniform treatment of retirement benefits around the country, which
was the statutory policy envisioned in the promulgation of ERISA. Id.
103. While uniform treatment of benefits is the goal of the Code, it also
8771992]
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Under the narrow interpretation theory, two participants of the same
plan could receive different treatment, depending upon their state of
domicile.' 0 4 More importantly, a broad interpretation of the scope of
§ 541 (c) (2) allows the self-employed or the owner-employee to have the
same security in their retirement savings as a non-owner employee.' 0 5
In light of these concerns, some recent decisions by circuit courts
adhering to the narrow interpretation of § 541(c)(2) indicate that these
circuits might reverse their previous positions and adopt the broad in-
terpretation view. For example, the Ninth Circuit in In re Kincaid 106
noted that there is "a certain incongruity in the notion that only ERISA's
anti-alienation provisions offer protection until bankruptcy, and only
state spendthrift provisions do so in bankruptcy."' 10 7
As mentioned earlier the broad interpretation, while effectuating
the intent of the Code and ERISA, has left some open questions in the
effectuates the intent of ERISA. WATSON & HOEFLICH, supra note 3, at 10. ER-
ISA was promulgated to protect covered employees and to ensure the availab-
lility of benefits promised under their retirement savings plans. Id. A broad
interpretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" ensures that all
employee benefit plans are protected.
104. For example, state spendthrift trust law in State A may disallow certain
ERISA-qualified plans as spendthrift trusts because they are self-settled, while
State B's spendthrift trust law, such as Indiana's, might define these same ER-
ISA-qualified plans as spendthrift trusts. Upon filing for bankruptcy, a resident
of State A would have to include his ERISA-qualified plans within his bankruptcy
estate, whereas a resident of State B would be able to exclude his ERISA-quali-
fled plans from his bankruptcy estate, even though both individuals are partici-
pants in the same type of plan. For a discussion of Indiana's spendthrift trust
law, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
105. Specifically, the broad interpretation theory protects an individual's
Keogh plan, which is a pension plan for the self-employed. Even though Keogh
plans are ERISA-qualified, by definition, they are self-settled trusts and are not
entitled to the protections provided to spendthrift trusts. By broadly interpret-
ing § 541(c)(2), such plans would be deemed subject to "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" and would therefore be excluded from a self-employed debtor's
bankruptcy estate. Thus, under the Velis court's broad interpretation, the self-
employed are granted the security they deserve in their retirement savings plans.
For a discussion of state spendthrift trust law, see supra note 7. For a discussion
of Keogh plans and their identification as self-settled trusts, see supra note 9.
106. 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990). The debtor in Kincaid was attempting
to exclude his 401(k) Deferred Salary Plan from his bankruptcy estate. Id. at
1164. The plan was ERISA-qualified, containing the anti-alienation and assign-
ment provisions as required by § 1056(d)(1) of ERISA. Id.
107. Id. at 1166. The Kincaid court was nevertheless unwilling to overturn
its previous holding in In re Daniel. Id. In Daniel, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Goff court's narrow interpretation of § 541(c)(2). Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1016 (1986). For a discussion the court's holding in Goff, see supra notes 39-58
and accompanying text. In In re Dyke, the court "recognize[d] that the federal
courts have not uniformly embraced [its] decision in In re Goff." In re Dyke, 943
F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1991). The Dyke court concluded that even if "we
were convinced that In re Goff states an incorrect interpretation of section
541 (c)(2), we still would have no authority to overrule an earlier decision of our
Court." Id. at 1442.
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context of retirement savings plans. For example, the broad interpreta-
tion will likely lead to closer scrutiny of a debtor's ERISA-qualified
plans, raising the question of what level of restriction is necessary to
qualify as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" for the purposes of section
541(c)(2). 10 8 In addition, in the context of pension plan funds, the
Third Circuit itself posed the question of what happens when pension
plan funds are used to purchase assets for the pension plan and not spe-
cifically for the debtor's own use. 10 9 Finally, while the Third Circuit ac-
knowledged that pension plans might be used fraudulently to shield a
bankrupt's assets, the court did not provide a definitive standard on
what is a "fraudulent conveyance."' 10 These questions raise the specter
of potential abuse and require further attention from the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by
broadly interpreting the scope of § 541(c)(2) to include restrictions
upon alienation and assignment enforceable under federal law, has
joined at least three other circuit courts in providing an individual
debtor with the protection of retirement savings plans envisioned under
both ERISA and the Code. Such retirement savings plans are protected,
ensuring the availability of their promised benefits, regardless of
whether the debtor is an employee, self-employed or an owner-em-
ployee. At the same time, a creditor is still given an opportunity to have
access via the bankruptcy estate to the ordinary payments from a
debtor's retirement plan under the provision of § 522(d)(10)(E). This
balancing of two juxtaposed interests serves the overall policy of the
Code.
James A. Boyd, Jr.
108. See Dean S. Waldt, 3d Cir. Widens Split on Pension Plan Protection, 129
N.J.L.J. 1106, 1106 (1991). Waldt points out that "boilerplate anti-alienation
provisions" might not meet the standards of § 541(c)(2) thereby leaving a pen-
sion plan open to the challenge of whether it is ERISA qualified. Id.
109. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991).
110. In Velis, the court noted that these retirement savings plans were still
"vulnerable to challenge as fraudulent conveyances or voidable preferences."
Id. Accordingly, "substantial or unusual contributions to a self-settled pension
trust made within the preference period, or with intent to defraud creditors,
should receive no protection under ... § 541(c)(2)." Id. While this provides a
framework for defining fraudulent conveyances, the court did not define what a
"substantial" or "unusual" contribution would be. Id. The court did acknowl-
edge, however, that in the Velis case, there was no evidence of an intent to de-
fraud on the part of the debtor. Id.
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